Serious injury to. The risk was recorded as low.
The same assessment listed death or serious injury.
On 10 May 2025, Jacoba was dredging for scallops in the English Channel.
A dredge bag chain became snagged.
A deckhand moved between the port main beam and the tipping bar to release it.
The mate lowered the beam.
It struck the deckhand and caused serious crush injuries.
He remained in hospital for three months. He has not returned to work since the accident.
The obvious explanation is crew position.
He was beside suspended equipment when somebody else controlled its movement.
But the report goes further.
Similar chains had snagged several times before on Jacoba.
The crew's normal response was to unpin the connecting shackle while the main beam remained suspended.
The method had worked before.
That matters.
Repeated success can make an improvised method feel controlled. The absence of accidents starts to look like evidence that the method is safe.
Meanwhile, the formal controls remained broad.
The risk assessment identified the possibility of being struck by the main beam. It recorded the risk as low, despite listing death or serious injury as the potential outcome.
There was no task-specific risk assessment for recovering and tipping the dredges.
There was no procedure for clearing snags.
The induction form contained one tick box covering fishing equipment and safety.
Practical familiarisation consisted of a vessel walk-around, observing one watch, and then completing a watch under supervision.
At the time of the accident, none of the crew had completed the basic health and safety training required for work on a UK-registered fishing vessel.
The training deficiency identified during the October 2024 inspection was still open seven months later.
These are different controls with different owners and purposes.
But they expose the same assurance problem.
A hazard can appear in a risk assessment without the routine job being controlled.
An induction can be signed without testing competence for the dangerous task.
An inspection can record a deficiency without the deficiency being closed before the vessel continues operating.
For a DPA or Fleet Manager, recurring snags are not operational noise. They are evidence that the planned method no longer covers the real job.
Watch the recovery, not only the normal cycle.
Identify who controls the winch.
Define where every person must stand.
Require positive confirmation before the beam moves.
Then verify that the arrangement remains workable when gear jams under pressure.
Which recurring snag in your fleet still depends on one person entering the danger area while another controls the movement?
#MaritimeSafety #FishingVessels #RiskAssessment #LiftingOperations #SafetyManagement
