World Prize. The SMS required fall arrest.
The worksite could not support the control it mandated.
On 14 October 2025, the crew of World Prize were preparing a pilot ladder after departure from Rönnskär.
At 0840, the bosun fell headfirst through an unguarded opening. He struck the lower platform of the accommodation ladder and entered the water.
He was not wearing a PFD or safety harness.
That invites an easy conclusion.
Required PPE was available. The crew did not use it.
But the report goes further.
The SMS made a self-retractable reel with a shock absorber mandatory when rigging a gangway or combination ladder.
Yet there were no attachment points above the accommodation ladders that met the SMS criteria.
The PFDs created another problem. They were incompatible with the ship's safety harnesses and could not keep an unconscious person's face above water.
Radio communication was also part of the control.
The ship did not have enough handheld radios. Speaking to the crew on the accommodation ladder required someone to lean over the ship's side.
These were not minor deviations around an otherwise workable system.
The workplace did not provide the conditions needed to apply the written controls.
Still, the permit recorded a safety net, harness, fall arrest device and lifejacket in use. It also recorded that the anchor points were strong enough.
The investigation found that many of those safeguards were not implemented at the worksite.
The planning sheet had already classified the operation as low risk and stated that no permit was required.
So the paperwork described one job.
The crew were doing another.
The pilot ladder davit was not fit for use. The crew had likely become accustomed to handling the suspended ladder manually.
Unsafe methods became normal. Nobody nearby interrupted the work. Nobody invoked stop work despite visible departures from the working-at-height procedure.
Calling this a failure to wear PPE is incomplete.
A control cannot depend on equipment compatibility, anchor points and communications that management has never verified at the actual worksite.
Once that gap becomes routine, the permit changes function. It no longer tests whether the job is ready to start. It records the answer the system expects.
For a DPA, the useful check starts before the signature.
Take the permit to the pilot embarkation station.
Identify the exact anchor point.
Connect the actual fall arrest device.
Wear the harness and PFD together.
Test communication with every person in the work team.
Then ask the responsible officer to show how each control works throughout the task.
If one step cannot be demonstrated, the permit must expose that failure. It must not conceal it.
When your SMS mandates fall arrest, who verifies that the control can physically be used before the permit is signed?
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