Grounding and subsequent. The watch alarm kept watchkeepers awake.
It did not keep them in the wheelhouse.
On Ocean Maid, that gap had become routine.
The lone watchkeeper made at least two visits to the galley during the approach to Fraserburgh.
Making tea was accepted practice onboard.
At approximately 0535, the watchkeeper checked the ETA. Around 0556.
Visibility was reduced by drizzle.
Lights were visible ahead and believed to be Fraserburgh.
The watchkeeper left the wheelhouse to make tea for the crew.
This was part of the usual pre-arrival routine.
Between 0540 and 0545, four course alterations were made.
The watchkeeper did not recall making them or checking the vessel's position after 0540.
At about 0545, the watchkeeper returned to the galley.
Four minutes later, Ocean Maid grounded on Cairnbulg Point at 8 knots.
The obvious explanation is an unattended wheelhouse.
But the alarm was working.
It kept watchkeepers awake. They routinely pressed reset when leaving the wheelhouse, giving themselves about 3.5 minutes to complete another task.
The control had become a timer for absence.
That practice did not develop in isolation.
There was no formal passage plan. Navigation relied on a previous track on one plotter and a line left by another user on a separate plotter.
Without identified hazards and a plotted route to monitor, navigation became reactive.
Fatigue narrowed the margin further.
The watchkeeper had been awake for more than 18 hours the previous day and slept for approximately five hours before taking the watch alone.
The required ten hours of rest had not been achieved during either of the two days before the accident.
Now consider what the alarm actually verified.
It confirmed that somebody could press reset.
It did not confirm where that person went next.
It did not confirm that the vessel's position remained monitored.
A functioning alarm can therefore produce false confidence. The equipment works. The risk remains uncontrolled.
For a DPA or Fleet Manager, testing the alarm is not enough.
Watch the full interval between resets.
Can the watchkeeper leave the conning position?
Which routine tasks pull them away?
Does the passage plan show what must be monitored during that absence?
And does anybody ashore know how the control is actually being used?
When your watch alarm is reset, what does your system assume about the next 3.5 minutes?
#MaritimeSafety #MarineAccidentInvestigation #FishingVessels #Grounding #Watchkeeping
