Karin operating as a recreational dive support vessel. The DSMB was visible to one dive boat.
Karin motored straight over its position.
Seventeen divers were in the water around two dive workboats. One pair was completing a decompression stop near the wreck of SMS Markgraf.
Karin passed over them at 3.2 knots.
Its rotating propeller struck and killed one diver.
The immediate explanation appears simple.
The skipper did not see the DSMB.
But visibility from Karin's wheelhouse was restricted by the vessel itself. The bow obscured the sea surface for approximately 100 metres ahead.
That limitation required another pair of eyes.
The deckhand was not on the bow. He was preparing food in the galley.
The DSMB had been visible to the crew of Jean Elaine, waiting on the other side of the wreck. They also noticed DSMBs close to Karin, but no warning reached Karin's skipper.
Communication between the skippers had effectively stopped after Karin arrived. It resumed only after a diver was reported missing.
This was not an empty dive site.
Two vessels were operating around the same wreck. Divers were ascending from different positions. Surface markers could appear outside the expected recovery area.
Yet the safety barriers depended on people noticing, interpreting and communicating the danger without a structured system connecting those actions.
Neither vessel had documented procedures or risk assessments for its crew.
There was no structured safety management system on either vessel.
On Karin, posting a lookout on the bow was described as normal practice. But normal practice is not a reliable control when nobody must verify that it is in place before the propeller turns.
The previous warning was even clearer.
Karin had already contacted a recreational diver during an earlier single-handed operation. That diver was also struck by the propeller and survived.
The hazard was no longer theoretical.
Still, the control remained informal.
No documented trigger required the lookout. No closed-loop communication confirmed where the other vessel's divers were surfacing. No operating arrangement ensured that information seen from Jean Elaine reached the skipper moving Karin.
For a DPA or vessel operator, writing "maintain a proper lookout" would not close this gap.
The control needs a subject, an observer and an intervention point.
Who must be on the bow?
When must that position be manned?
Who confirms it before propulsion is used?
What message must pass between vessels when a DSMB appears near another boat?
If those answers depend on what the crew normally does, the system is still relying on memory and goodwill.
How does your procedure prevent propulsion from being used when the skipper cannot see the water where divers may surface?
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