Fatal injury to. The inspection programme was in place.
Significant wear was still carrying the load.
Honeybourne III. 6 October 2023. Sixteen nautical miles south of Newhaven.
The crew tensioned the dredge beam against its safety chains.
A 32mm link in the quick-release assembly parted.
A 155kg towing block fell and fatally struck a deckhand working below.
The obvious explanation is wear.
There was plenty of it.
The load-bearing components supporting the dredging gear were significantly worn. Wear at the crowns of the chain links exceeded the maximum allowed by EN 818-6 guidance.
The onboard inspection programme had not detected the substandard gear.
But wear was only part of the problem.
The chain itself was not intrinsically unsound. The technical analysis found that it was capable of performing as designed under linear loading.
That was not how it worked on the vessel.
The chain passed over a static steel pin at the derrick head. This introduced secondary bending into the links. Wear on the pin increased those bending moments further.
A chain can meet its specification and still be unsafe in its actual arrangement.
That distinction should change how management reads an inspection record.
The same fleet had already experienced a similar quick-release chain failure on Isla S in September 2022.
Remedial action followed.
The MAIB concluded that it was insufficient to prevent the failure on Honeybourne III.
The assurance layers were still present.
An SMS.
An inspection programme.
A competent person.
MCA surveys.
Yet the crew had no formal training in lifting equipment inspection. There was no evidence that the company had assessed the skipper’s ability to judge its condition.
The regulator did not examine whether competent persons could perform effective inspections and thorough examinations. Nor did it actively verify that inspections met an appropriate standard.
Competence was required.
Capability was not demonstrated.
More frequent inspections would repeat the same weakness if the inspector lacked training, rejection criteria and a clear understanding of the loaded arrangement.
For a DPA or Fleet Manager, the record is only the start.
Can the inspector expose the critical components?
Do they understand how the arrangement loads them?
Do they have defined rejection criteria?
Has anyone observed them carrying out the inspection?
If the answer stops at competent person, the control stops at a title.
Where does your lifting equipment assurance verify actual capability rather than merely record that an inspection occurred?
#MaritimeSafety #Auditing #MarineAccidentInvestigation #LiftingOperations #FishingVessels
