Weston Bay. They called it a self-shooting system.
A deckhand still had to work beside moving pots.
On 22 May 2024, two deckhands went overboard from the fishing vessel Weston Bay.
One died.
The first deckhand was struck by a pot, knocked down and taken overboard by the next pot in the sequence.
The second entered the water while trying to assist.
The obvious explanation would focus on experience.
It was the first deckhand's first week on board. Only his second time working that station.
But the report goes further.
The method of shooting did not physically separate the crew from the fishing gear.
The so-called self-shooting system still required manual downstacking.
People remained inside the machinery of the task.
The risk assessment had identified entanglement and impact hazards.
Yet the risk outcome was blank.
The risk level was recorded as low.
The documented control was: "roller system no lifting over side."
That did not control the risk during pot deployment.
Previous tangles had already caused several pots to shoot together.
Nothing serious had happened before.
That absence of injury could look like evidence that the method worked.
It was not evidence. It was a warning without consequences.
Then the recovery controls were tested for real.
The emergency ladder began to fail as soon as the crew tried to use it.
The deceased deckhand's PFD became separated from him.
He remained in the water for 44 minutes before a pilot vessel recovered him.
The crew had not routinely carried out emergency drills. The last recorded drill was six months before the accident.
Even the recorded MOB drills did not use or demonstrate the recovery equipment.
This is where management assurance breaks down.
A risk assessment can name the hazard and still fail to control the job.
A drill record can exist without testing recovery.
An inspection can record no defect while critical equipment deteriorates.
For a DPA or vessel operator, the test must leave the folder.
Watch the complete shooting sequence.
Include the tangles, rushed movements and unexpected releases.
Identify where physical separation disappears.
Then deploy the actual MOB equipment.
Test whether the crew can recover someone who cannot climb, grip or assist.
Check the PFD on the person wearing it. Not only on the inventory.
The control is not proven when the form is complete.
It is proven when it survives the real task.
If your next MOB casualty is unconscious, which recovery control has your crew physically demonstrated will work?
#MaritimeSafety #FishingVessels #ManOverboard #RiskAssessment #EmergencyPreparedness
