Collision between the. Mandatory training helped Serinah's crew survive.
Neither deckhand had completed formal navigational training.
On 25 April 2024, the crude oil tanker Apache collided with the stern trawler Serinah in the Firth of Clyde.
Serinah sank rapidly.
All three crew abandoned to the liferaft. Nobody was injured.
That was not luck alone.
The investigation found that mandatory training and regular drills improved their chances of survival.
The emergency preparation worked.
But the collision prevention system had failed much earlier.
Serinah was fishing. Apache was the give-way vessel.
Neither vessel took avoiding action in accordance with the collision regulations. Both crews made assumptions about what the other vessel intended to do.
At 0.8 nautical miles, a deckhand put Serinah's helm hard to starboard.
The trawled gear limited the vessel's rate of turn.
Apache maintained course and speed.
By then, the available options were disappearing quickly.
The report found that neither deckhand had completed formal navigational training. They were not equipped to understand the developing situation or the need for earlier action.
This is not a criticism of the deckhands.
They were placed on watch without the competence needed for the risk they were expected to control.
Serinah's operator had not assessed the navigational risk of leaving an inexperienced crew member in charge of the watch.
That is the management failure.
Emergency preparedness reduces consequences.
Navigational competence should reduce likelihood.
They are different controls.
A completed set of mandatory safety courses cannot prove that somebody can interpret a traffic situation, apply the collision regulations and act while useful sea room still exists.
Yet a watch bill can make that assumption look official.
For a DPA or vessel operator, checking certificates is only the start.
Look at who actually keeps the watch.
What navigational training have they completed?
Who has observed them interpreting a developing situation?
Can they explain when the stand-on vessel must act?
Do they understand how fishing gear changes the manoeuvre available?
Then check the risk assessment.
Does it address the competence of the person on watch, or merely confirm that mandatory courses were completed?
The crew proved they could respond after the collision.
The system had not verified that they could prevent one.
If your watch bill names someone as watchkeeper, what evidence shows that person can recognise the risk and act before manoeuvrability runs out?
#MaritimeSafety #FishingVessels #CrewTraining #Watchkeeping #Collision
